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Abstract
South African society bears a legacy of inequality and 
struggle against oppression. In the Constitutional era, our 
courts have held that the right to equality is a core fun-
damental value against which all law and state practice 
must be tested. South Africa’s Equality Courts have been 
heralded as a transformative mechanism for the redress-
ing of systemic inequality and the promotion of the right 
to equality. Following the aft ermath of the 2008 xeno-
phobic attacks in South Africa, the University of Cape 
Town Refugee Law Clinic, on behalf of some of the vic-
tims of these attacks, launched equality claims against the 
South African Police Services in order to address the unfair 
discrimination and xenophobia of police offi  cials in pro-
tecting these victims. Th is paper reviews the two matters 
launched by the Clinic in the Equality Courts, examining 
the challenges that eff ectively reduce the accessibility of 
the Equality Courts and the diffi  culty inherent in proving 
discrimination in equality claims, and commenting on the 
benefi ts of using these courts to address xenophobia.
Résumé
La société sud-africaine porte un héritage d’inégalité et de 
lutte contre l’oppression. Dans la période constitutionnelle, 
nos tribunaux ont statué que le droit à l’égalité était une 
valeur fondamentale, à la mesure de la quelle toute loi et 
pratique d’État doit être testée. Les Tribunaux de l’Éga-
lité d’Afrique du Sud ont été salués en tant que mécanisme 
de transformation et de redressement des inégalités systé-
miques, et de la promotion du droit à l’égalité. Suite aux 
conséquences des attaques xénophobes de 2008 en Afrique 
du Sud, la Clinique du Droit des Réfugiés de la University 
of Cape Town a lancé, au nom de certaines victimes de 
ces attaques, des revendications d’égalité à l’endroit des 
services de police sud-africains, dans le but de soulever le 
problème de l’attitude discriminatoire et xénophobe des 
offi  ciers de police lors de la protection des victimes. Cet 
article examine les deux causes présentées par la Clinique 
aux Tribunaux de l’Égalité, les facteurs réduisant l’accès 
aux Tribunaux de l’Égalité, les diffi  cultés de prouver la 
discrimination dans les revendications d’égalité, et éva-
lue l’utilité de faire appel à ces tribunaux en matière de 
xénophobie.
Introduction
Historically, South Africa operated a tightly controlled 
“closed-border” policy with regards to the vast majority of 
migrants.1 However, aft er the fi rst democratic elections in 
1994 the country opened up internationally and became a 
party to a number of important human rights instruments, 
including the United Nations (UN) Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees2 and the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) Convention Governing Specifi c Aspects 
of Refuge Problems in Africa.3 In doing so South Africa 
affi  rmed its commitment to receive and protect individ-
uals in need of care due to persecution or hostilities in their 
home countries.
Following this shift  in policy and practice towards a 
human rights orientated migratory regime, an increased 
infl ow of migrants into South Africa .became evident.4 
Regrettably, however, violence against foreign nationals has 
been an ongoing element of post-Apartheid South Africa.5 
In March 1998, only four years into the constitutional 
democratic era, a Human Rights Watch report on the situa-
tion in South Africa confi rmed that:
Since the 1994 elections, South Africa has seen a rising level of 
xenophobia. As in many other countries, immigrants have been 
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blamed for a rise in violent crime, drug dealing and a rise in drug 
abuse, unemployment, and other social ills. Immigrants from 
African countries have been the target of attacks, oft en because 
they are perceived as being in direct competition with South 
Africans for jobs or services. In addition, African immigrants 
are oft en the target of random violence and robbery, as crimin-
als perceive them as easy targets because they are unlikely to go 
to the police. Th e police and Home Aff airs offi  cials have shared 
this antagonism toward foreigners. Th e generally negative atti-
tude toward foreigners encourages and condones abuses by police, 
army, and Home Aff airs offi  cials not only against those suspected 
of being undocumented migrants, but also against non-South 
Africans who are lawfully in the country, who can expect little 
or no help from the police when they themselves are victims of 
crime, including violent assault and theft .6
Th e UN High Commissioner for Refugees has recently 
reported that xenophobia in South Africa undermines refu-
gees’ local integration and the stability of their livelihoods, 
oft en compelling individuals to reside in more expensive 
inner-city areas for fear of attacks in the townships.7 An 
analysis of the reference to foreigners in the print media 
conducted by the Southern African Migration Project in 
2000 found that a shocking fi ft y-six percent of press articles 
referring to foreign nationals contained at least one nega-
tive reference and twenty percent contained four or more.8 
Th ese reports demonstrate the insidious nature of xeno-
phobic attitudes in South African society.
In 2008, xenophobia in South Africa reached new 
heights, as large waves of violent attacks swept across the 
country,9 almost infectiously, leaving sixty-two people dead, 
670 wounded, many women raped, over 100 000 people 
displaced and property worth millions looted, destroyed or 
seized.10
In the aft ermath of the attacks the University of Cape 
Town (UCT) Refugee Law Clinic (hereaft er “the Clinic”), 
which has been providing free legal assistance to refugees11 
throughout Cape Town since 1998, was approached by a 
number of victims of the attacks. In addition to reporting 
the loss of their possessions to looters, the individuals 
reported police offi  cials’ refusal to assist them in protecting 
their property.
Th e Clinic formulated a response to these allegations that 
led to the institution of legal proceedings in the Western 
Cape High Court, sitting as the Equality Court, for an 
action of vicarious liability against the Minister of Safety 
and Security on the basis that the members of the South 
African Police Services (hereaft er “the police”) exercised 
their function during the xenophobic attacks in a dis-
criminatory manner and failed to provide adequate protec-
tion to the Complainants due to their nationality.
Th e purpose of this paper is to explore in more detail 
two of these cases: Said and others v the Minister of Safety 
and Security (“the Said matter”),12 and Osman v Minister of 
Safety & Security (“the Osman matter”).13 While the Osman 
matter has been fi nalised, the Said matter is currently pend-
ing leave to appeal. One of the objectives of the Clinic in 
bringing these cases was to test the Equality Courts as a 
forum for combating xenophobia. Th e aim was not simply 
to seek ordinary civil damages but to utilise the wide powers 
of these special courts to attempt to root out the ingrained 
xenophobia within the police offi  cials.
Structurally, this paper will commence by outlining the 
direct link, which the Clinic observed between xenophobia 
and its clients’ right to equality. Phrased conversely, a xeno-
phobic mindset resulted in the discriminatory provision of 
services by the police to the refugee victims of the xeno-
phobic attacks. Th e second section will consider the Equality 
Courts and the perceived advantages, which led the Clinic 
to institute the proceedings in that particular forum. Th e 
third section will then discuss the Said and Osman matters, 
outlining the experiences of the Clinic during the litigation 
process. Finally, this paper will discuss some of the challen-
ges which were experienced during the litigation process in 
the Equality Courts.
Given the prevalence of xenophobia in South African 
society, creative measures are necessary to address this 
problem. One such mechanism is legal accountability 
through the promotion of access to justice, which entails 
perpetrators being brought before the courts and aff ords 
the victims a forum to have their voices heard. It was the 
opinion of the Clinic that the objectives and structure of the 
Equality Courts represented the best forum for this purpose.
Xenophobia and the Violation of the Right to 
Equality
In order to have the Said and Osman matters heard in the 
Equality Courts, as the Clinic set out to do, it was neces-
sary to ground the cause of action within the ambit of the 
Promotion of Access to Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act.14 What this entailed was establishing 
a clear link between xenophobia and the clients’ right to 
equality.
Th e dictionary defi nition of xenophobia is an ‘extreme 
fear or dislike of people from other countries’.15 However, 
the term is more commonly used to denote a hatred of for-
eigners characterised by a negative attitude towards such 
individuals.16
In his obiter dictum, Sachs J in his minority judgement in 
the Union of Refugee Women v the Director: Private Security 
Industry Regulatory Authority17 held that such prejudice 
was prevalent in South Africa and that it struck at the heart 
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of our Constitution.18 Justice Sachs went on to note that 
the purpose of refugee law is to overcome experiences of 
trauma and displacement. Adverse treatment in the host 
country would defeat this objective and induce an experi-
ence of alienation and helplessness.19 Kondile AJ, writing 
for the majority of the Constitutional Court, confi rmed that 
refugees, by virtue of the fact that they have been compelled 
to fl ee their homes for fear of persecution, constitute a vul-
nerable group in our society.20 Consequently, discrimina-
tion against refugees constitutes discrimination against 
a vulnerable group and impairs their rights in a serious 
manner.21
In the leading case on state liability for police negligence, 
Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele,22 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that police offi  cers are liable for 
their failure to perform their statutory and constitutional 
duties.23
It was the case of the Clinic in the Said and Osman mat-
ters that the police had discriminated against the victims of 
the xenophobic attacks on the basis of their nationality. As 
a vulnerable group the police owed a statutory and consti-
tutional duty of care to the individuals and had those indi-
viduals not been foreigners the police would have exercised 
their function diff erently. In this way, it was the argument of 
the Clinic that the litigants were the victims of discrimina-
tion, which had infringed their rights to equality and dig-
nity resulting in both constitutional and general damages.
In essence, the deeply ingrained xenophobic attitude 
of the police offi  cers, who were charged with quelling the 
xenophobic attacks, adversely aff ected the exercise of their 
function. However, eradicating such a manifestation of 
xenophobia requires more than a simple damages claim 
paid by the state. Rather, it requires a reshaping of the per-
spectives of the police offi  cers on the ground. For this rea-
son the Clinic identifi ed the Equality Courts as a forum for 
attempting to address the problem.
Th e Equality Courts
In 2000, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (“the Equality Act”)24 was passed with 
the intention that it would be the key legislative tool for the 
enforcement and promotion of the right to equality.25 Th e 
draft ers of the Equality Act sought to achieve this end by 
providing victims of unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment with a forum to provide access to justice and an 
eff ective remedy.26 Although the main impetus for the cre-
ation of the Equality Act was likely addressing the inequal-
ities of South Africa’s Apartheid era,27 Section One of the 
Act expressly includes “nationality” among the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination and defi nes nationality as “eth-
nic or national origin and includes practices associated with 
xenophobia and other adverse assumptions of a discrimina-
tory nature.”28
Th e Act designates all Magistrate Courts and High 
Courts as Equality Courts for their area of jurisdiction.29 
In doing so the intention is not to extend jurisdiction to 
the courts to hear equality matters in their normal capacity, 
but rather to create special Equality Courts for the various 
areas, which would be staff ed by trained judicial offi  cers 
and administrative clerks.30
Training of staff  in the nuances of the Equality Act 
and in equality jurisprudence plays an important part in 
the Equality Court’s divergence from the normal prac-
tice adopted in South African courts. Th e Equality Act 
Regulations31 expressly require the judicial offi  cer to ascer-
tain the relevant facts and question the parties and wit-
nesses.32 For Albertyn et al.33 this active involvement of 
the judicial offi  cer could assist in the creation of an access-
ible, informal and participatory proceeding, levelling the 
playing fi eld in the case where a disadvantaged party may 
not have the resources to obtain skilled lawyers.34 Th is 
model is more akin to an inquisitorial structure as opposed 
to the adversarial system upon which the South African 
legal system is currently based and as such judicial offi  cers 
may not be accustomed to relinquishing their customary 
role as a “neutral umpire.”
Within the context of this inquisitorial court structure 
the Equality Courts are intended to be public spaces which 
allow for the proliferation of diff erent voices, previously 
denied under apartheid South Africa.35 In this way the 
Equality Courts are not merely special rooms for dealing 
with equality matters but a transformative tool for bringing 
about greater justice for all.36 Th is notion of the courts as a 
“public space” was fi rst proposed by Bohler-Muller in 2000.37 
She suggests that the transformative jurisprudence of equal-
ity requires that individuals not be seen as independent 
rights-bearing entities but rather within a contextual real-
ity.38 For Bohler-Muller the “ethic of care,” as she explains 
dictates that competing interests be weighed and that con-
clusions be reached which are the least harmful to the most 
vulnerable party.39 Eff ectively, the challenge for Equality 
Courts is not to simply address each case mechanically, but 
rather to contextualise the cause of action so as to tailor 
a remedy which addresses not only the discrimination in 
question but rather goes to the root of the problem, address-
ing societal discriminatory structures. In doing so the 
courts are the guardians, of sorts, for vulnerable categories 
of individuals. Th e Bench Book for Equality Courts,40 which 
is the text developed as the training programme for judicial 
offi  cers, requires that presiding offi  cers take account of the 
diff erences among South Africans so as to ensure fair and 
just decision making in the challenging area of Equality.41 
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Th is requires a comprehensive approach to social context 
education, despite such training being a complex task.42 
Nevertheless, proper contextual judging must be seen as a 
powerful and eff ective way to ensure a move towards sub-
stantive equality and supports the independence and cred-
ibility of the judiciary.43
Th is “public space” where Complainants are permitted 
to have their grievances heard by an adjudicator trained to 
view the incident through a socially conscious lens attracted 
the Clinic to the Equality Courts. It was felt that given the 
vulnerable place of refugees in society, and the harm they 
suff ered, the cases had to be handled with due care by an 
adjudicator with the proper mindset.
Th e other key dimension of the Equality Court which 
drew the Clinic to the forum was the extensive powers with 
which these courts are vested. Section 21 of the Equality Act 
confers wide power on the court in order to address both 
individual and systemic forms of inequality.44 Albertyn et 
al. suggest systematic violations of equality are not solved 
by individual court orders, rather the Equality Courts are 
required to provide relief which addresses the underlying 
causes of discrimination and seeks to reform the social atti-
tudes, structures and institutions.45
In addition to the normal court remedies, Section 21 
permits the court to make the following forms of orders: 
damages in respect of the impairment of dignity, pain and 
suff ering, emotional and psychological suff ering;46 damages 
in the form of an award to an appropriate body or organisa-
tion;47 availability of specifi c opportunities and privileges 
unfairly denied;48 Special measures for the addressing of 
the unfair discrimination;49 an unconditional apology;50 an 
appropriate deterrent;51 and, an order to comply with any 
provision of the Act.52 Section 21 further permits the court 
the power to enforce these remedies through an internal 
audit of the respondent53 and a structural interdict requir-
ing the respondent to make regular progress reports.54
Albertyn et al. suggest that the novelty of these remedies 
coupled with the complexity of equality matters require 
presiding offi  cers to be given the skills and resources neces-
sary to engage creatively with these remedies.55 Th e juris-
prudence seems to suggest that many of the courts have 
indeed done so to some extent. In Strydom v Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Gemeente Moreleta Park,56 a case in which a 
teacher had been dismissed by the respondents on the basis 
of his sexual orientation and refusal to submit to a “cure” for 
his homosexuality, the court utilised both the damages pro-
visions of the Equality Act, and further ordered remedies in 
the form of an unconditional apology. Likewise, in Sonke 
Gender Justice Network v Malema57 the court ordered that 
Mr. Malema, a prominent political fi gure in South Africa, 
make a public apology, by way of press release, and pay 
damages to an appropriate institution.58 Th e Judge even 
found it fi t to off er Mr. Malema some words of wisdom in 
relation to his place as a public fi gure.59
In short, the Equality Courts have distinct advantages 
permitting the hearing of inherently sensitive matters in an 
informal and accessible forum where the courts are empow-
ered to tailor eff ective remedies to, not only address the 
matter at hand, but the deeper societal issues for which the 
Act was intended to combat. For these reasons the Clinic 
approached the Equality Courts on behalf of a number of 
clients who had been victims of the 2008 xenophobic attacks. 
Th e aim was to not only seek justice for the individuals con-
cerned but also to utilise the Equality Courts as a means to 
address the xenophobic prejudice held by the police offi  cers 
who had discriminated against the Clinic’s clients.
Th e UCT Refugee Law Clinic Cases
As a result of the chronology of events the Clinic fi rst 
launched the Said matter, which was soon followed by the 
Osman matter. In order to keep the chronology of events 
clear this paper will discuss the two cases in the order in 
which they were instituted.
Th e cause of action in the Said matter preceded the main 
waves of xenophobic attacks, occurring over a two day 
period in March 2008. Th e main attacks then fl ared up in 
May 2008 in Johannesburg before spreading to Durban and 
eventually back to Cape Town60 where the litigant in the 
Osman matter was then aff ected.
Th e Said matter saw the rising up of the residents of 
the informal settlement of Zwelethemba, near the Karoo 
town of Worcester in the Western Cape. Th e shops and 
livelihood of refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo were looted, and in most 
cases completely destroyed. Th e perpetrators were South 
African residents who were not only the neighbours of the 
migrant population in the settlement but also the patrons 
of the small businesses they ran. When the looters took to 
the street they armed themselves with weapons and shouted 
xenophobic slogans. It was common cause between the par-
ties that police offi  cers from Zwelethemba, Worcester and 
Paarl were present in Zwelethemba at the time of the looting.
It was the Complainants’ case that the police discrimin-
ated both directly and indirectly against them in the exer-
cise of their duties. It was fi rst argued that the police actively 
refused to provide assistance to the Complainants, thereby 
discriminating against them by actively guarding the 
South African owned shops while refusing to provide this 
same assistance to the Complainants on the basis of their 
nationality.
Th e Complainants argued further that their position in 
South African society, as a vulnerable category of persons,61 
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dictated a higher degree of care. Th e failure to meet this 
standard amounts to “adverse eff ect” discrimination, which 
occurred irrespective of the intention of the police.62
Th e Complainants sought to invoke the broad powers 
conferred on the Equality Court,63 by seeking relief which 
is three fold: [1] damages; [2] an unconditional apology and 
public admission of acts of unfair discrimination; and [3] a 
structural interdict requiring the police to establish a train-
ing program aimed at instructing police offi  cers through-
out the Western Cape on providing services to refugees in 
a sensitive manner. Th e Complainants further requested 
that the structural interdict be implemented by the South 
African Human Rights Commission, which was joined 
to the proceedings as a third party. Th is combination of 
remedies was possible within the list of creative remedies 
which the Act empowers the court to order. It was felt that 
by utilising this unique mechanism it would be possible for 
the court to, not only come to the assistance of the desti-
tute Complainants, but also to root out the discriminatory 
and xenophobic attitude, which lead to the harm which the 
Complainants suff ered.
Despite numerous delays in the proceedings, some of 
which will be addressed in the next section of this paper, 
Justice Erasmus handed down a decision on December 
8, 2011. Th e court noted that refugees, as forced migrants, 
are unable to seek protection from their own governments 
and embassies and are therefore dependent upon the South 
African government.64 It was noted further that discrimina-
tion on the basis of ethnic and social origin are within the 
scope of the right to Equality.65 However, the court ultim-
ately came to the conclusion that:
… [T]he balance of probabilities support the view that the police 
were in fact not given orders to guard either Foreign owned or 
South African Shops. Th e evidence suggest that this was a con-
scious decision taken, motivated primarily by lack of resources, 
and the primary goal of saving lives, and not discrimination.66
On this basis, the court found that the Complainants had 
failed to prove that the Respondents had discriminated 
against them.67 However, the judge expressed his concern 
that the matter could not be left  there.68 He noted that 
the police had failed to prevent the looting and when the 
Complainants attempted to give statements to the police 
there was a clear lack of sensitivity exhibited by the police.69 
Quite rightly Judge Erasmus stated that:
I am of the view that the police’s failings in the above respects 
can be at least partly explained by an acute lack of sensitivity on 
their part to the light of refugees, their particular vulnerability, 
given their history and the likelihood of being victims of multiple 
trauma.70
In order to address this concern, Justice Erasmus found 
that, sitting as the Equality Court, he was empowered by 
the Equality Act to order the South African Human Rights 
Commission to provide training to relevant stakeholders 
and monitor and assess the observance with the recommen-
dations it had outlined in its interim report.71 Th e report, 
which was prepared by the Human Rights Commission 
in terms of the interim order of the court, recommended 
that the police make adequate resources available to the 
Zwelethemba police station, provide personnel with sensi-
tivity training and the implementation of eff ective monitor-
ing of human rights violations and xenophobic incidents.72 
As laudable as this fi nding is, the Clinic remains convinced 
that the actions of the police were a manifestation of xeno-
phobic attitudes held by the police, which resulted in the 
discrimination against the Complainants. Th e Clinic has 
therefore fi led for leave to appeal in this matter and at the 
time of writing the matter remains sub judice.
Th ough launched aft er the Said matter, the Osman mat-
ter ran concurrently with the fi rst case. By May 2008 the 
xenophobic attacks had returned to Cape Town and rose, 
resulting in the looting of the Complainant’s shop in the 
informal settlement of Dunoon, near Milnerton in the 
Western Cape. Th e Complainant testifi ed that he drove to 
the shop to fi nd three police vans standing nearby, whilst 
the looters were still carrying goods out of his shop. He testi-
fi ed that he approached one of the police offi  cers for assist-
ance in removing the remaining goods from his shop. Th e 
police offi  cer responded that they would only assist him 
if his employees were still in the shop, but they would not 
assist simply to remove goods. He was then instructed by 
the police to leave Dunoon as the situation was becom-
ing more dangerous. Th e Complainant testifi ed that he 
was gravely upset as he had seen his shop being destroyed 
whilst several heavily armed policemen merely looked on 
as though this was part of an “evening’s entertainment”. 
Th e Equality Court accepted that a case of discrimination 
had been made out and therefore the onus shift ed to the 
Respondents. Nevertheless, the court ultimately dismissed 
the claim, fi nding that in the absence of further evidence 
to support the Complainant’s version it could not make a 
determination on his allegations.73
What the Osman matter illustrates is the stringent 
burden placed on claimants to prove a prima facie case 
of discrimination in equality claims. Until this point has 
been reached, the presumption is that no rights violation 
has occurred. Discrimination is, however, notoriously dif-
fi cult to prove, particularly in situations where there is no 
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express discrimination but rather a more insidious attitude. 
As discussed above, the court held that where a prima facie 
case has been made out this must be weighed against the 
rebutting evidence adduced by the respondents, however, 
the Equality Act is not clear on whether the onus shift s con-
clusively or who bears the ultimate burden.74 However, this 
creates a “grey area,” alluding to the possibility that a claim-
ant retains some form of residual burden.
A similar shift ing burden procedure is contained in the 
Labour Relations Act,75 which provides that an employee 
must prove the existence of a dismissal and then the onus 
shift s to the employer to either rebut the dismissal or to 
prove that the dismissal was nevertheless procedurally 
and substantively fair.76 In this way the legislature has 
reversed the general principle that a person who claims a 
legal entitlement bears the onus of proving the factual basis 
of that claim.77 However, within the context of a dismissal 
it has been established that an employee is still required to 
adduce evidence that proves the dismissal was unfair. Th e 
employee cannot simply rely on a lack of evidence from the 
employer as grounds for substantiating a blank statement of 
unfairness.78 In the same way the fi nding of Davis J in the 
Osman matter can be seen as a requirement that the claim-
ants adduce evidence to support the allegation of discrimin-
ation rather than simply relying on the respondents’ failure 
to rebut the claimant’s prima facie case. Th e diffi  culty with 
this is, however, linked to the problems with proving dis-
crimination. Th e eff ects may be severe but the proof thereof 
may be all but impossible and therefore the rights violation 
may go unchecked.
Th e Challenges Faced in the Equality Courts
Unfortunately, during the course of the proceedings a num-
ber of the challenges documented by other authors, which 
plague the functioning of the Equality Courts as a whole, 
were encountered.79 While the Complainants in both mat-
ters were represented from the outset by the Clinic and 
counsel, the need for legal representation was clear. All the 
Complainants were asylum seekers and refugees residing in 
informal settlements and would have been unable to secure 
legal representation had it not been for the Clinic’s assistance. 
Th e State, on the other hand, briefed both senior and junior 
counsel at great expense to the tax payers. Th is clearly illus-
trates the situation where a well resourced respondent would 
spare no expense thereby placing a vulnerable indigent 
complainant at a disadvantage were it not for pro bono legal 
assistance from an organisation such as the Clinic. However, 
given the complex evidential aspects and legal arguments 
which were addressed during these proceedings this mat-
ter clearly dictated the involvement of skilled litigators. For 
instance, in the absence of South African jurisprudence on 
adverse eff ect discrimination, it was necessary to research 
foreign law in order to develop an argument. It would be 
diffi  cult to see how this could be accomplished without the 
assistance of legal representatives.
Public awareness was clearly a concern for the court in 
the Said matter. Th e judge consistently noted the need to 
bring the Equality Courts within the contemplation of the 
general public as an accessible and prominent forum and 
as such made numerous accommodations to the press and 
public. Th is concern from the judiciary, however, requires 
the support of the government, NGOs and civil society in 
order to overcome this challenge.
Th e most glaring challenge which was highlighted by 
these cases was the impact of the workload placed on the 
Equality Court clerk and the detrimental impact that this 
had on the eff ective running of the cases. From the outset 
the Clinic attorneys experienced diffi  culty with initiating 
and administering the cases as the representatives of the 
Complainants by virtue of the fact that the Cape Town 
High Court has only one trained Equality Court clerk, who 
acts in her capacity as such over and beyond her function 
as a clerk of the High Court and work in the High Court 
Certifi cation offi  ce. In her absence no substitute was catered 
for and ordinary court personnel simply refused to provide 
any assistance as it was not their function. As a result, where 
the clerk of the Equality Court was not at work, or unavail-
able for whatever reason, the Clinic attorneys were required 
to make numerous trips in order to accomplish the simple 
task of fi ling documents. For the attorneys this was a time 
consuming and costly inconvenience, but an unrepresented, 
and possibly indigent complainant faced with such obstacles 
may well be frustrated into abandoning a good case.
Th is is a clear example of the overburdening of Equality 
Court staff , which the various commentators have identi-
fi ed is a key challenge.80 In practice this proved to be a ser-
ious hurdle to the proper and timeous administration of the 
cases and is a critical issue, which the Equality Courts must 
address in order to properly perform their functions. For 
instance, the proceedings in the Said matter, on one particu-
lar day, were set down to be heard in a court which was woe-
fully inadequate, given the number of individuals attending 
the proceedings. In light of this situation it was necessary 
to address the court on the administrative ineffi  ciencies of 
the Equality Courts. Counsel for the Complainants submis-
sions were as follows:]
M’Lord, may I appeal to you and to those who are responsible for 
the functioning of [the] Equality Courts that the Equality Court 
matters have to [be recorded] on the court roll like any other mat-
ter. A court has to be assigned before the time like any other court 
matter. Th e clerk of the Equality Court has to ensure that she is 
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present when Equality Court matters are heard. If she is absent 
there has to be a substitute assigned like in any other High Court 
matter… .81
Th rough this address two key administrative failings are 
highlighted: Firstly, although the Equality Courts are spe-
cialist courts operating within the existing court structure 
they require the same consideration as any other court 
matter. Specifi cally, court allocation and recording of the 
hearing should be done in the normal course. Secondly, the 
Equality clerk, or her substitute, must be involved in the 
matter and present at court so as to ensure that the func-
tions ascribed to the clerk by the Act and the Regulations 
are complied with. Th ese two concerns could be achieved 
through a policy shift  without necessitating structural 
changes to the Equality Courts. Nevertheless, the impact 
that this will have on the administration of cases will be an 
important step forward for the proper functioning of the 
courts. If the administrative challenges of the courts remain 
un-addressed, Counsel for the Complainants quite aptly 
submitted that: “[t]his matter has to be addressed urgently… 
. otherwise other prospective litigants would be reluctant to 
refer unfair discriminations to the Equality Court …”82 Th is 
should further be seen in the context of the fact that the 
Complainants in the Said matter were represented by the 
Clinic and Counsel. An unrepresented complainant would 
face severe prejudice due to these administrative failings 
and, as stated by Counsel, this may act as a deterrent to 
individuals whose rights have been violated. It was, how-
ever, encouraging that the court did not simply dismiss 
these submissions out of hand. Rather the Judge stated the 
following:-
I will see that the defi ciencies in the organisation of the court is 
brought to the attention of both the court manager and the Judge 
President. Th e unfortunate situation is that under normal circum-
stances, when the High Court sits as a High Court, the Judge sits 
with his personal registrar and the registrar makes all the arrange-
ments. Unfortunately, the situation has arisen that the registrar of 
the Equality Court also has other functions and it seems there’s 
room for improvement. Th e concern that I share with you is that 
the Equality Court is supposed to be a court that promotes equal-
ity and advance those values in our constitution that promotes 
human dignity and it is not dignifi ed for Complainants to come 
to a courtroom like this, that is totally inadequate, and I need to 
address that and I will do that, and may I use this opportunity to 
apologise to the Complainants for the inconvenience that they are 
suff ering today.83
Th e author hopes that the Judge’s undertaking will have 
an impact and result in this critically needed redress of 
the administration of the Equality Courts. In this passage 
the Judge noted an institutional distinction between the 
Equality Courts and the ordinary courts, which if addressed 
could resolve many of the overburdening problems cur-
rently faced. Th e handing over of the administrative func-
tions relating to the allocation of courts to each individual 
Judge’s registrar would spread the workload. Moreover, the 
registrars are accustomed to making such arrangements as 
it is a function that they ordinarily fulfi l.
Concluding Remarks
South Africa bears a legacy of inequality and struggle 
against oppression, the result of which has been a democrat-
ically elected government and a constitutional assertion that 
the Republic is now based on human dignity, the achieve-
ment of equality and the advancement of human rights.84 
Within this context the Equality Courts have been heralded 
as a transformative mechanism for the redressing of sys-
temic inequality and the promotion of the right to equality. 
Unfortunately, post-apartheid South Africa has been char-
acterised by deep-rooted xenophobia. Th is widely held atti-
tude has resulted in violent attacks on foreign nationals and 
in discrimination against migrants. Refugees in particular 
are a vulnerable category of migrants who, by virtue of the 
inherent nature of their condition, are unable to seek assist-
ance from their own country or embassy. As a result they 
are likely to be the most prejudiced by any discriminatory 
action motivated by xenophobic opinions.
Despite the state’s obligation to protect the people within 
its territory, and its obligation to provide asylum to refugees, 
the Clinic’s clients who approached the Clinic in the aft er-
math of the xenophobic attacks complained of discrimina-
tion at the hands of the police. Th is prompted the Clinic 
to approach the Equality Courts to seek redress for those 
aff ected by this disheartening treatment of the migrants 
who have entered the Republic in search of protection.
During the course of the proceedings the Clinic attor-
neys experienced fi rsthand how the poor administration of 
the courts could be detrimental to a case and particularly 
if the litigants are unrepresented, how this may lead to the 
abandonment of a claim and the reluctance to utilise the 
courts again. Th e second interesting aspect which emerged 
during these proceedings was that of the shift ing onus of 
proof. Given the diffi  culty in proving discrimination, a 
residual burden of proof is problematic. However, at this 
stage this question remains open.
As a consequence of the diffi  culties of proving discrimin-
ation, particularly when the events occur during a violent 
uprising and without clear written instructions, the Equality 
Court in both the Said and Osman matters were at pains 
to fi nd against the Complainants but nevertheless ruled 
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in favour of the state. Th e Clinic, however, remains of the 
opinion that the disparity in the services provided by the 
police offi  cials to the Complainants, as opposed to the South 
African nationals, was motivated by xenophobic attitudes. In 
order to address the root cause of this pervasive problem the 
Clinic continues to petition the courts for relief.
Given the results in the above-reviewed matters, and the 
institutional challenges faced in bringing forth these equal-
ity claims, the inexorable question which remains to be 
answered is whether the Clinic would approach the Equality 
Courts again, and why? Th is question would be answered 
in the positive. Th rough this experience with the Equality 
Courts the Clinic observed several key benefi ts. Firstly, 
there was a great deal of media coverage of the cases, bring-
ing the plight of refugees and the victims of xenophobia 
to the attention of the South African public. Secondly, the 
Equality Courts off ered the Clinic’s clients a notable public 
space to voice their grievances and also to hear the explana-
tions off ered by the police witnesses who testifi ed in court as 
to the police conduct. Th irdly, the requirement by the court 
for the South African Human Rights Commission to pro-
vide attitudinal training to police offi  cials will expectantly 
have a positive impact. Lastly, the proceedings ensured that 
the Police Services were held accountable and this raised a 
heightened sense of the care needed when handling refu-
gees so as to avoid future liability.
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